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ABSTRACT
One of the most powerful claims of disability theology is that the
rejection of persons with disabilities somehow correlates with a
rejection of God. This ‘correlative rejection’ is, however, frequently
just stated rather than explored in detail, something this article
therefore seeks to remedy by examining one example of the
correlative rejection that draws together the ethical concerns of
theologians writing on intellectual disability with Meister Eckhart’s
teaching on the human relationship with God. Here, the correla-
tive rejection is exposed as an inevitable result of the narrow
emphasis on autonomy and rationality in human self-perception
which shape the habituated, even ritualised ways that we try to
know persons with intellectual disabilities and God. By contrast,
truly knowing and relating to persons with intellectual disabilities,
God, and finally also ourselves, relies on a reconciliation with the
dependence, vulnerability, and non-rational forms of exchange
that a narrow attachment to autonomy and rationality seems
directly to occlude. The correlative rejection thus signals both a
practical and epistemological problem which results from how we
view ourselves and how we subsequently relate to and try to know
others, the harmful effects of which are both ethical and spiritual.
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Introduction
At the heart of much disability theology lies a powerful claim ‘To reject the disabled
because they are disabled is to reject God’.1 Taking this claim seriously means
recognising that the social and ethical concerns raised by disability theology also
represent a profoundly theological problem. However, despite the clear importance
of this claim to the genre, the nature of this ‘correlative rejection’ of persons with
disabilities and God has not been examined with the detail it deserves. This article
therefore develops the discussion, focusing on how the rejection of persons with
intellectual disabilities by the ‘able’ in contemporary society parallels the rejection of
God as considered by Meister Eckhart in his teaching on ‘detachment’ (abegeschei-
denheit). In both cases, we will see, rejection results, on the one hand, from a self-
perception narrowly centred on presumed norms of rationality and autonomy and
on the other, from ratio-centric attempts to know and relate to persons with
intellectual disabilities and God. For theologians writing from their relationships
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with persons with intellectual disabilities, just as also for Eckhart in his account of
the human relationship with God, these norms are revealed as a false account of our
being human and a limited form of knowing and relating to others which is
particularly detrimental to our receptivity towards persons with intellectual disabil-
ities and God. By contrast, receiving and knowing persons with intellectual disabil-
ities requires a re-habituation to the dependence, vulnerability, and non-rational
dimensions of our knowing and relating which can occur through reciprocal, caring
and committed relationships with persons with intellectual disabilities themselves.
For Eckhart too, although our relationship with God is radically different from
relationships with other humans, knowing and relating to God through detachment
requires a comparable reconciliation with the same dependent and vulnerable reality
of our being and a similar release of ratio-centric knowing. In the particular case of
persons with intellectual disabilities and God, the correlative rejection thus describes
the ethical and spiritual consequences of assumptions about human existence which
are not just false, but epistemologically limiting, obstructing our capacity to know
and relate to persons with intellectual disabilities and God by shaping our interac-
tions with them in ways that always already reject.
In the following three sections, we will explore a definition of intellectual dis-
ability before considering how people with these life experiences are often viewed in
western society. Peter Singer’s work will provide an example of both common
assumptions about people with intellectual disabilities and the patterns of self-
perception and ways of knowing and relating to others which shape these assump-
tions. The view which Singer exemplifies will then be scrutinised through Thomas
Reynolds’ work on the ‘cult of normalcy’ where we will consider in more detail the
ritualised pattern of response to persons with intellectual disabilities, exposing the
views of the previous section as, in fact, a defensive rejection of those who under-
mine what we believe to be true about ourselves, played out in the ritualised attempt
to assimilate or stigmatise them. We will then turn to the insights of authors who
write from the experience of committed relationships with persons with intellectual
disabilities, in particular Henri Nouwen and Jean Vanier. In total contrast to Singer,
people with these life experiences are identified as of equal worth to anyone else and
with a clear capacity to engage reciprocally in relationships if we are willing to know
and receive them in ways that do not immediately obstruct relation by rejecting and
devaluing how and what they have to give. Building relationships with them, we will
see, demands a reconciliation with the realities of dependence and vulnerability, both
theirs and our own, which are seemingly anathematised by a self-perception and
approach to relation rooted in autonomy and rationality. Most important of all, this
experience is itself expressed by Vanier and Nouwen as a reconciliation with
dimensions of our being human together that are, in fact, essential to human relating
and which are encountered daily in the repetitious activities of care. It is with this in
mind that we will then turn to Eckhart’s account of the human relationship with
God. Eckhart closely parallels both the critique of autonomy and reason, the associa-
tion of these with limiting and, again, seemingly ritualised ‘ways’ of knowing that
obstruct our relationship with God, and finally, the identification of dependence and
in some sense also vulnerability, as the basis for a knowledge of and relationship
with God that transcends these limitations.
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Wholeness, worth, and intellectual disability
‘Intellectual disability’ is a broad label affixed to numerous kinds of life experience.
Nevertheless, as Jill Harshaw notes, citing the International Classification of Diseases
(ICD 10),2 it always includes several criteria: ‘[1] a significant impairment of intelli-
gence. . . [2] a significant impairment of social functioning which comprises a range of
conceptual skills. . .social skills. . .and practical skills’ and, finally, ‘[3] an onset before the
age of 18’.3 Within these criteria, the World Health Organisation also distinguishes the
severity of an intellectual disability as either mild, moderate, severe, or profound.4
While some people with mild or moderate intellectual disabilities can live indepen-
dently or with minimal support, can learn practical and social skills, and may also work
full- or part-time jobs, persons with profound intellectual disabilities may have little or
no voluntary movement or capacity for verbal communication and a negligible capacity
to develop or employ the cognitive abilities and social functioning skills noted above.
For most persons with intellectual disabilities, their cognitive and physical impair-
ments mean they depend on support for at least some daily activities and for those with
profound intellectual disabilities this can reach a seemingly total dependency and lack
of capacity for communicative exchange. Partly because of this dependency and their
potentially limited capacity to understand or clearly communicate experiences, they are
at higher risk of various kinds of harm and abuse and for this reason are counted as
‘vulnerable adults’ in the UK care sector.5
Dependent, vulnerable, and cognitively impaired, the lives of persons with intellec-
tual disabilities cannot but contradict a view of human wholeness, worth, and relating
which prioritises autonomy and rationality. To consider the nature and prevalence of
this view and its subsequent effect on how persons with intellectual disabilities are
perceived, we will draw on Peter Singer’s work focusing, not on his utilitarian ethics,
but on the assumptions about the wholeness and worth of some forms of life over
others, thinly veiled in the account of ‘personhood’ upon which his ethics depends.6
In Practical Ethics, Singer takes personhood as a category for determining whose
preferences should have priority in ethical decision making. Personhood, Singer insists,
is distinguished by ‘characteristics like rationality, autonomy, and self-awareness’ and a
person, because of these characteristics is ‘aware of itself’ and thus ‘capable of having
desires about its own future’.7 Singer does not, however, simply apply these traits to a
concept of the human individual as an isolated entity. They have another role which
Singer does not explicitly draw out but which is essential to his argument, that of
communication. Without the capacity for language use or other forms of complex and
concept-sharing communication, Singer’s ethics cannot function for it depends on an
individual’s capacity to communicate to others that they are rational, autonomous, and
self-conscious beings, and this capacity is premised on the traits which already identify
them as persons. There is therefore an implicit preference towards certain kinds of
exchange, or relating, through which someone might reveal their wholeness and worth
– their personhood – to someone else.
Rationality is, as such, much more than just an ontological trait or a tool for enabling
autonomy in Singer’s account of personhood. It makes possible certain ways of know-
ing or relating, certain complex concept-sharing forms of communication which we
often assume to be essential for understanding each other and, in this case, for
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identifying each other’s wholeness and worth, or personhood. Recognising this is
fundamental if we are to properly understand why Singer’s view of personhood
inevitably rejects persons with intellectual disabilities, for the traits by which he defines
personhood are simultaneously the principal means of identifying a ‘person’ as such.
According to Singer’s criteria, the dependence, vulnerability, and cognitive impairments
of persons with intellectual disabilities thus immediately reveal their non-personhood to
us, not through our open attempt to understand their life experiences, but because they
cannot communicate with us and about themselves in ways that would identify them as
persons. They cannot even object to this demotion, for by prioritising rationality and
rational forms of exchange Singer’s account already rejects or hierarchically devalues
non-rational forms of exchange, treating them either as ethically irrelevant or as always
less significant than the preferences and communications of ‘real’ persons.8 Only a
person can therefore meaningfully object to being excluded from the category of
personhood and this statement indicates more than just grammatical syllogism, for
the circularity of Singer’s argument is rooted in the relational practices it prioritises just
as much as in the categories it applies to people. It is, as such, a practically grounded
syllogism shaped by the particular ways in which we attempt to know and relate to
others. If we accept the premises of Singer’s argument, or rather, if we choose to
prioritise the same traits as he does in our ways of interacting with and valuing other
people, then agreeing with his judgement of persons with intellectual disabilities is
inevitable, for when it comes to evaluating their wholeness and worth (their person-
hood) absence of evidence can be taken directly as evidence of absence.
Some might question this reading of Singer, particularly in its clear assumption that his
account of personhood is, in truth, a scale that measures the worth of certain lives over
others. Yet as Singer clearly indicates, his use of the category of personhood, similar to that
operative within much contemporary ethics,9 is an attempt to apply ‘common-sense’
assumptions about what makes a life valuable to practical ethical situations in a consistent
and systematic way.10 Singer’s work is therefore one example of the narrow prioritisation
of rationality and autonomy as the criteria by which we define human wholeness and
worth in western society, criteria which we prioritise, not just theoretically but also
practically, in specific forms of rationally grounded communication and exchange.11
Many would not follow Singer to his often controversial conclusions regarding abortion
and euthanasia. Yet if his work (and other similar studies12) meaningfully exemplifies
presumed ‘common-sense beliefs’, these conclusions simply expose the potential impact of
these beliefs on our judgement of persons with intellectual disabilities. For even outside of
controversial ethical debate, we frequently assume in our society that those who depend on
others for their day-to-day activities have limited or no capacity to lead worthwhile lives,
contribute to society, or engage reciprocally in meaningful forms of communication and
relation.13 We define the lives of persons with intellectual disabilities entirely by their
apparent deviation from our norms and frequently act towards them (if we even engage
with them) as if they therefore have no gifts or strengths at all.
Rejection and the cult of normalcy
Challenging this view clearly requires us to question Singer’s basic premises from the
outset and Thomas Reynolds does precisely this in his work Vulnerable Communion.
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Reynolds offers a theoretical model, the ‘cult of normalcy’, with which we can re-
evaluate both why we seem often to commit to the norms of rationality and autonomy
and how this commitment shapes our reaction to persons with intellectual disabilities
whose lives seem so incompatible with the dominant norms of western societies.
Reynolds starts with a concept of human being that emphasises our dependence,
vulnerability, and relationality. We are creatures with a deep need to be welcomed in a
safe space that we might call home, a place which fulfils our instinct for survival, but
which also provides the social environment where we might learn the skills that allow
us to ‘navigate the relationships by which we not only survive but also find value and
purpose in that survival’.14 The ‘basic question of human existence’ is therefore
‘whether there is welcome at the heart of things’, a welcome because of which we can
survive, grow, and flourish.15
Society provides this ‘space’ of welcome and it does so according to certain patterns.
Reynolds articulates this with reference to Charles Taylor’s notion of ‘frameworks’ in
which are embedded a particular group’s notion of the ‘good’ which comes to structure
our sense of identity and worth.16 Reynolds adds to the notion of frameworks, insisting
that our sense of identity and worth also come through forms of reciprocal and
embodied exchange which communicate the ‘good’. We thus share in a worldview
that is both conceptually communicated and ‘bodily instantiated, only possible insofar
as we are able to participate in practices that characterize a corporate way of dwelling
together and reflect its vision of the good’.17 This, of course, requires us to have the
cognitive (and physical) abilities which make participation possible, allowing us to give,
receive, sustain, and reinforce the sense of identity and worth which we receive through
what Reynolds calls the ‘economy of exchange’ within a particular group.18
For Reynolds, whether or not a group is a ‘cult of normalcy’ depends on its response
to ‘difference’, to those who do not fit into the norms by which group members define
their identity and worth and who do not or cannot conform to the group’s economy of
exchange. Members of the cult of normalcy respond to such difference with a ‘set of
rituals trained upon demarcating and policing the borders of a “normal” way of
being’.19 We react defensively, in other words, to an apparent contradiction of our
values and Reynolds gives two examples of how this occurs relevant for our discussion.
First assimilation, when we accept others to the extent that we can perceive or remake
them according to our own image.20 Second, stigmatisation – when assimilation is
impossible, we define people entirely by their real or perceived differences, affixing
labels to them which frame a concept of who they are through a vocabulary that
distinguishes them from ‘normal’ people, allowing us to justify and treat as normal,
our barrier-creating practices and attitudes.21 Specifically for our discussion then, the
practices through which we treat persons with intellectual disabilities, and the negative
judgement of their worth and wholeness which occurs when we judge them solely by
the norms through which we define ourselves, follows a ritualised pattern which helps
sustain our sense of what is normal.
These two ritualised responses expose something fundamental to Reynolds analysis:
for those within the cult ‘difference’, or in our case intellectual disability, is experienced
as disruptive. This simple observation takes us to the heart of the cult of normalcy, since
the experience of difference as disruptive reveals what it means for the norms of the cult
to be meaningful and dependable measures of our identity and worth. The ritualised
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patterns of stigmatisation or assimilation in response to difference expose an underlying
belief that to sustain our sense of who we are, our norms must be the measure against
which we can judge all others. In short, we presume that they must be universally true
and the concepts and practices which shape our encounters with others therefore pre-
contain and project our commitment to this universality. This means that the problem
of the cult is not simply that we reject those whose presence is experienced as
disruptive, but also that belief in the universality of our norms makes this rejection
inevitable, since our norms must epistemologically structure what and how we can
receive from others if we are to sustain this belief and the secure sense of identity and
worth which it offers.
For our discussion then, the norms of autonomy and rationality become the form
and filter of our knowledge of persons with intellectual disabilities in a way that leads
inevitably to rejection. Conceptually, we stigmatise them, defining them entirely by
what they are not (their lack of autonomy and rationality) or we assimilate them to the
extent that they are ‘like’ us.22 Practically, we only treat as meaningful those forms of
reciprocal exchange and self-expression rooted in the rational and physical capacities
which they lack to varying degrees, meaning that their ways of relating and of sharing
who they are with us appear intrinsically limited or even non-existent. The combination
of these concepts and practices and the unwavering commitment to the premises of
normalcy gives the cult a self-justifying logic, both conceptually and practically
grounded, which structurally mirrors the syllogism of Singer’s approach to personhood.
The final and most insidious dimension of the cult, however, is its capacity to relabel
actions that indisputably reject and cause harm. Through the circular logic of the cult,
we can be absolved of the role that our actions and attitudes have in limiting the
flourishing and social participation of persons with intellectual disabilities, treating their
impairments as the cause of their tragic but unavoidable exclusion from a world into
which they simply do not fit and in which they have nothing to offer. Wedded to the
authenticity and universal validity of our norms of rationality and autonomy, we enter
fully into an epistemologically enclosed ‘ritual of knowing’ which does more than
simply reject persons with intellectual disabilities, it allows us to justify this rejection
in such a way that we cannot even perceive it.
A fundamental question, of course, is why do we presume that our norms must be
universal and inflexible if they are to meaningfully measure identity and worth? The
answer Reynolds gives takes us back to the basic need in our sociality – the need for
security from ‘the intractable uncertainties and perils of our existence in a finite and
contingent world’.23 At the heart of the cult is a basic fear of the vulnerability and
dependence upon which our relational existence is unavoidably constructed. We fear
these realities because they indicate our exposure to harm, as creatures out of control of
the world we are born in and out of control of other people on whom we depend in
order to survive and to grow. The western cult of normalcy which Reynolds specifically
critiques is thus doubly defensive and self-deceptive, for the norms of rationality and
autonomy offer not just the security of a sense of self and of worth, they do so explicitly
by stigmatising the dependence and vulnerability on which human sociality and
identity is built. Accordingly, the presence of persons with intellectual disabilities is
doubly disruptive, for they reveal the falsity of our norms in a general sense, destabilis-
ing their function as universal measures of our identity and worth which give us a sense
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of security, and they do so in a specific way by living lives that reveal the dependence
and vulnerability we fear in ourselves and that our norms of autonomy and rationality
seem intended to overcome.
It is important to recognise, finally, that this doubled defensiveness of the western
cult of normalcy actually exposes a limitation in Reynolds’ argument, but one which
helps us better understand the next step in our argument. Reynolds does not clearly
distinguish between the North American cult of normalcy he critiques and the cult of
normalcy as a general category. This might make rigorous application of his theory
more difficult than the above analysis has implied, but it shows us something important
about Reynolds’ starting assumption. For him, the values of North American society,
particularly its emphasis on rationality and autonomy, are socially constructed and not,
therefore, valid as universal measures of human identity and worth.24 Reynolds speaks,
in other words, from outside the ‘ritual of knowing’ his work critiques and he does so
for an important reason. Like many other authors writing theologically on intellectual
disability, Reynolds writes from the context of a committed and caring relationship with
someone who has an intellectual disability, in this case, his son Chris.25 In particular, as
Reynolds himself states, he writes from his experiences of having his own assumptions
and expectations challenged by learning to love and accept Chris, as well as learning to
receive Chris’s love and acceptance of him.26 This relationship is therefore crucial for
understanding what Reynolds’ work on the ‘cult of normalcy’ actually represents. It is
not an attempt to theorise from neutral ground. Rather, it gives a theoretical voice to
how the view exemplified by Singer appears from the perspective of someone who has
experienced a shift in their concept of identity, wholeness, and worth, someone, in
other words, whose ‘rituals of knowing’ have been transformed and it is this transfor-
mation we must now consider.
Listening anew
In what follows, we will explore how significant the context of relationships with
persons with intellectual disabilities are for this transformation, allowing us to outline
an alternative account of human wholeness, worth, and relation, as well as of what it
therefore means to ‘know’ persons with intellectual disabilities. This helps solidify the
claim that a view like Singer’s in fact falsely judges the experience of being human.
More importantly, it also shows that a narrow commitment to the norms of autonomy
and rationality, which creates the self-justifying logic we saw in Singer and in the cult
epistemologically, limits our perception and leads us to ignore or hierarchically devalue
the elements of human existence and forms of reciprocal exchange and communication
discussed below. To do this, we will look in particular at Henri Nouwen’s relationship
with Adam, which he describes in Adam, God’s Beloved. We will draw out elements of
Nouwen’s experience that clearly expose what a narrow commitment to the norms of
rationality and autonomy occludes, as well as identifying the role of dependence and
vulnerability in shaping a context where our ritualised and epistemologically limiting
commitment to these norms can be transformed and where a new form of knowing
becomes possible.
Nouwen shows us, first of all, that ‘knowing’ each other and, thus, coming to
perceive the worth and equality of another human being to oneself, depends on
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practices and interactions that are not simply grounded in reason, but in the body and
in our dependence upon and vulnerability before others. Adam, whom Nouwen got to
know at the L’Arche Daybreak community, had a profound intellectual disability. He
could not use language and his physical disabilities meant he was very dependent upon
support for day-to-day activities. Nouwen initially gave in to the temptation ‘to look
only at Adam’s disabilities’,27 focusing on the differences between them and treating the
challenges of relating to and receiving Adam simply as a problem of Adam’s
impairments.28 The absence of linguistic communication is especially significant in
Nouwen’s account of his own transformation, both because of the emphasis on words
in his own life as an academic theologian and because it was in the absence of words
that he learned to listen to the body, both Adam’s and his own.29
This shift from an intellective to affective perception seems to represent a general
shift in Nouwen’s way of receiving or knowing Adam, in his sense of Adam’s receiving
and knowing him back and in his own way of communicating himself. It is a point
emphasised repeatedly in L’Arche and by Jean Vanier, its founder, who, speaking from
50 years of experience living in community with persons with and without intellectual
disabilities, maintains that ‘understanding, as well as truth, comes not only from the
intellect but also from the body’,30 a claim which he applies to all human beings.
Critically, this opens up the possibility for recognising persons with intellectual dis-
abilities, even those with profound intellectual disabilities, as not simply passive reci-
pients of support, but also as people capable of giving and of communicating
understanding and truth. As Nouwen recounts, it was Adam who helped him redis-
cover the importance of his own body and to recognise how his own ratio-centric route
of self-understanding and self-affirmation led him to ignore this fundamental dimen-
sion of his being himself, a dimension which he had to become reconciled with in order
to ‘hear’ and accept Adam.31 Nouwen makes absolutely clear that at the heart of this
and of his difficult journey of self-discovery, was the recognition of his own neediness
and vulnerability, realities which made him recognise a sameness between himself and
Adam that he found difficult to accept.32 Yet it was his reconciliation with these realities
in himself which enabled a personal growth and a deepening of his appreciation for
Adam and his gifts and, Nouwen insists, this was made possible because of what was
shared in his caring for Adam and receiving Adam’s care for him.33
The idea of persons with intellectual disabilities as gifted care-givers, rather than
needy care-recipients, challenges our assumptions about their lives, but it is a vision
deeply rooted in Jean Vanier’s perception of them as persons with a tremendous
capacity to be themselves gifts to our world.34 Central to receiving them and receiving
from them, as Nouwen shows us, is learning to listen in new ways, focusing on more
than just words by recognising bodies, gesture, touch, sound,35 and even silence,
stillness and presence,36 as essential to human relating and communicating. At the
same time, the context of this renewed listening is also fundamental. As many with
experience of L’Arche communities attest, it is in the context of committed and caring
relationships that a new form of knowing grows, one which, through acceptance of
dependence and vulnerability in others and eventually also in ourselves, we can trust in
the wholeness and value of different kinds of exchange and different sorts of gifts, even
those of persons with profound intellectual disabilities whose inner lives and intentions
must always, in some sense, remain a mystery.37 In other words, we can become
8 D. G. W. SMITH
habituated, or re-habituated, to a new form of relating and knowing, through relation-
ships with persons with intellectual disabilities, where acceptance of dependence and
vulnerability is essential if we are to know them with a perspective that does not simply
denigrate and reject them. Crucially though, it is persons with intellectual disabilities
themselves who invite this, who ask us to receive them as equal to ourselves, and who
invite the change which allows a real relationship to occur, one grounded not just in a
truer recognition of who they are but, as Nouwen attests, in a truer perception of
ourselves.38
There are two conclusions to draw from this, albeit necessarily tentative due to the
brevity of the discussion above. The first is that theologians like Nouwen, Reynolds, and
Vanier indicate the value of a much broader account of what is going on in human
relating and communicating than that offered by Singer, revealing more plainly in his
work the hierarchical assessment of what sorts of traits and forms of exchange con-
stitute and reveal a person’s wholeness and worth. As Nouwen’s writings attest, Adam
was a deeply gifted man who transformed the lives of many who met him, but whose
gifts could never be perceived as such in the view exemplified by Singer. Such a
perspective would likely reductively interpret Adam’s ‘gifts’ as reflecting the needs
and even projections of others rather than indicating something intrinsic to Adam.
Indeed, this perspective must interpret Adam’s gifts as such, for truly accepting his
giftedness would mean recognising in it the sign of a different measure of human
wholeness and worth and would thus require a breakdown of the whole self-justifying
cycle of the cult’s ‘rituals of knowing’, the loss of belief in the universality of its norms.
The second point is the importance of context for transforming the narrow emphasis
on rationality and autonomy in our perception of what forms of life and exchange have
worth. Clearly for Nouwen, the context which makes transformation possible includes
the whole community life at L’Arche, where weakness is embraced rather than deplored
and where accepting weakness as an important part of community life is seen as part of
a path to greater flourishing. But at the centre of Nouwen’s experiences and of the
L’Arche communities are persons with intellectual disabilities themselves. People who
communicate, share, give, and receive, whose dependence and vulnerability is in many
ways obvious, but living with whom can invite a reconciliation with the same realities in
our lives. Such sharing makes possible a kind of relating and knowing totally inacces-
sible to us when we focus narrowly on autonomy and rationality, inevitably rejecting
persons with intellectual disabilities and also ourselves.
These two points indicate the truth-revealing and relationship-enriching effects of a
form of self-perception and a way of knowing to which theologians of intellectual
disability are habituated through their own relationships with persons with intellectual
disabilities. At the same time, it is a self-perception and a way of knowing entirely
occluded, or its worth hierarchically subordinated, in the perspective exemplified by
Singer. Such treatment, as we saw earlier, is inevitable, for the self-justifying logic of
that perspective, now identified as rooted also in self-deception, must reject all contra-
diction, all difference, if it is to remain stable. In the end, this reveals the tragic irony of
the cult, for in the search for welcome and acceptance, for safety in a world we cannot
control, we act out on others the exclusion, rejection, suffering and chaos which we fear
for ourselves while grasping after a dream of security which can never be delivered, for
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it is premised on the denial of realities we cannot escape and which are themselves,
finally, a critical part of what it means to be human and to flourish.
There is, however, a third response to ‘difference’ which overcomes this cycle of
injustice and self-deception and which contrasts with the rituals of assimilation and
stigmatisation: the transformation of our norms. Of course, letting go of our narrow
emphasis on the concepts and practices which define our identity and worth is not just
an unpalatable option but a frightening one which undermines our sense of security
and in fact exposes another reason why we reject those whose presence we find
disruptive: we fear what accepting them requires of us. Transformation is thus challen-
ging but it is not impossible and the world is full of teachers, for as Nouwen, Reynolds,
and Vanier show, such transformation can occur by living alongside, listening to, and
being received by those whom we reject.
Losing our ‘ways’
As stated in the introduction, the goal of this article was to interrogate the claim
that the rejection of persons with disabilities because they are disabled correlates
with a rejection of God. The following analysis of Meister Eckhart’s teaching on
detachment will allow us to examine this correlation directly. Eckhart, we will see,
identifies the same narrow emphasis on autonomy in our self-perception and of
ratiocination in the ‘ways’ of knowing which we apply to God. These directly
obstruct our receiving and knowing God, for both involve in some sense a denial
of our own being and of God as source of all being and truth. At the same time,
truly knowing and relating to God occurs once again in the context of our depen-
dence and with a knowing that transcends natural reason. In this case, however, we
know not through close and mutual interrelationships, but through the passive
reception of God’s action alone, receiving God’s presence in the ground of our
being in a spiritual union that reflects precisely, because it completes, the ontological
dependence on God as Creator through which we exist in the first place. The
spiritual focus of Eckhart’s works reveals the rejection of God as, again, an episte-
mological and practical problem, just like the rejection of persons with intellectual
disabilities, though in this case it is not God but we who suffer by turning away
from the source of all being and beatitude.
The recurring theme of detachment in Eckhart’s sermons charts the reorientation
of the soul’s way of being and perceiving in what Kieckhefer rightly identifies as a
habitual, rather than ecstatic, union with God.39 However, Eckhart does not present
it as a step-by-step process and this is likely an intentional move, since he is deeply
concerned with the human tendency to become habitually attached to certain ‘ways’
to God. As he puts it: ‘Whoever is seeking God by ways is finding ways and losing
God’.40 In sermon 1, Eckhart’s critique of these ‘ways’ focuses on the attitude of
‘possessive attachment’ (eigenschaft) with which people often approach practices of
‘fasting, keeping vigil praying and the like’. These, he says, are all good works, but
doing them for something in return reflects a mercantile desire ‘to engage in a
process of bartering with our Lord’.41 The problem here, as Eckhart makes clear, is
not simply the attachment to certain ritual practices, nor to something we desire
from God. The real problem of eigenschaft is the habituated form of self-perception
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which it reveals, the belief that we belong to ourselves enough in the first place to
engage in such bartering.
[These merchants] deceive themselves in their trade . . . For they are what they are on
account of God, and what they have comes to them from God and not from themselves . . .
they do not give from what is theirs, nor do they act for themselves.42
For Eckhart then, eigenschaft most importantly describes our mistaken attribution of an
autonomy or ownership over our lives which, in fact, belong to God.
This is itself a statement of the difference between human and divine being. As
Eckhart asserts in sermon 28, only God can properly be called ‘Ego’ for God alone is
One and, as he emphasises in his Commentary on Exodus, this oneness also indicates
God’s self-sufficiency, God’s needing nothing other than Godself for God’s existence,
which is identical with God’s essence.43 God’s being is thus utterly different from
creaturely being, independent and infinite, where we are ontologically limited and
dependent on God as source of our being. We exist, as such, in a relation of asymme-
trical dependence upon God and the various practices where we display this attitude of
eigenschaft, including sometimes religious rituals, reflect our failure to recognise this
truth. Detachment is, in one sense, Eckhart’s response to this, a process by which the
soul is reoriented towards and reconnected with the truth of its own being, turning
back towards its absolute dependence upon God without whom it is literally ‘nothing’.44
It involves the reformation or, as Kieckhefer indicates, the habituation to a God-centred
self-perception which recognises God alone as the ‘somethingness’ undergirding our
being and giving us to ourselves.
For Eckhart, these issues with our false self-perception overflow into how we try to
know God. In detachment, we must overcome all the ways in which we treat God
effectively like an object in the world, since this places us (as knowers) and creation (as
the source and site of our normal ways of understanding) in a position of priority over a
God who, properly speaking is the prior cause of creation and of our capacity to know.
This leaves us grasping another kind of ‘way’ just as obstructive as the self-perception
rooted in eigenschaft mentioned above. Yet in this case it is not the ‘way’ of particular
rituals or of habituated self-perception, it is a ‘way’ of knowing appropriate for things in
the world but profoundly inappropriate when applied to God. This, Eckhart makes
clear, is because we know all creatures through some ‘means’, through an image of them
which our natural reason creates in response to sensory impressions of things in the
world.45 No such image of God is possible, however, for only God can perfectly imagine
Godself and the image God has of Godself is the Word, the eternal Son of God.46
Knowing God, as such, means participating in God’s self-knowledge and for this the
soul’s normal (ratiocinative) ‘ways’ of knowing and of trying to understand and be
itself, must be transcended. Our reason, Eckhart states, must fall into nothingness and
unknowing if we are, finally, to pass into our ‘ground’ and know God truly.47
The idea of the ground is central to Eckhart’s spiritual anthropology and
epistemology.48 It is the site and source of our most personal, transformative, and
continual encounter with God, where the soul is at its ‘purest, noblest and subtlest’.49
This purity also identifies the ground as the soul’s point of closest connection to God,
indeed, the point of its unity and coming forth from God, revealing an apparent
synonymy between the ground and the Imago Dei in Eckhart’s theology.50 It is the
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point of the soul’s deepest unity with God through which it is created and towards
which it must turn in order to know God and become itself most fully.51 The ground is,
therefore, simultaneously the focus of Eckhart’s spirituality and theological
anthropology,52 such that knowing or relating to God ties up with truly being and
becoming ourselves, living lives oriented completely towards the source from which
that life at the same time springs. To enter or turn towards this ground, the soul must
become a silent nothing, still, pure, empty, and naked – all of its ‘knowing’ turned to
‘unknowing’ its will and self-grasping negated along with all the ways in which it seeks
after a control other than God’s. Indeed, the whole orientation of the soul’s being is
transmuted from outward activity in the world, to an inward passivity defined, in
sermon 103, as ‘potential receptivity’,53 a receptivity explored in the same sermon
cycle in terms of the soul’s ‘passivity’, or ‘suffering’ of God’s presence.54
The term ‘potential receptivity’ is used only once in Eckhart’s German works but it
evokes a clear sense of the role of the ground in detachment, as a kind of space where
God might be received and present as Godself.55 Critically, it is not our action which
enables us to know or receive God, but our detachment from all of our own actions and
our becoming utterly receptive to God in that ‘place’ at the core of our being which, at
the same time, belongs completely to God since it is made in his Image. Detachment is,
as such, less a particular action or process than a negation of our normal actions and
processes, an un-habituating or de-ritualising of our ‘ways’ of knowing and of under-
standing ourselves, which only clog up our receptivity to God in the ground. In a sense,
detachment therefore mirrors the kind of transformation experienced by Nouwen. For
him, the ways of knowing and relating to persons with intellectual disabilities which
always already rejected them were revealed and transformed in the vulnerable space of
relation where Nouwen learned to receive Adam beyond the limited concepts and
practices of knowing and relating shaped by a narrow commitment to autonomy and
rationality that also defined Nouwen’s self-perception. Yet, unlike in human relation-
ships, where treating others as purely passive recipients of our gifts or strengths leads us
to deny their giftedness, detachment leads to a totally asymmetrical relationship, since
knowing God in the ground through detachment relies entirely on God’s own action,
God’s sharing with us God’s presence and self-knowledge. Such radical dependence, we
might think, involves a similarly radical exposedness or vulnerability and Eckhart’s
frequent use of ‘blôz’ (which means emptiness but also bareness and nakedness) to
describe the soul in its ground perhaps indicates this. However, in detachment such
exposure is radically transformed. For although in our exposedness before each other
there is always the possibility of limited and thus also harmful relating, God, as infinite
and self-sufficient, completely transcends such limitations and their effects. God there-
fore receives us and gives to us unrestrainedly when we turn to receive God, as Eckhart
states, God cannot not be present to the soul when it goes out of itself through
detachment. 56 As we turn towards God there is therefore no risk of harm and we
are left with an entirely positive sense of vulnerability and dependence. They seem to
shape the ground of our God-centred existence, the ground which is also the site of a
relating to and knowing God where this relies not on our own, but on God’s actions,
will, knowledge, and self-sufficient autonomy, as the infinite Creator whose unrest-
rained giving is the source of healing and life.
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Conclusion: theology, ethics, and the correlative rejection
The correlative rejection of persons with intellectual disabilities and God, as presented
in this article, seemingly results when we narrowly emphasise autonomy and rationality
in our self-perception and prioritise ratiocination in our attempts to know others,
human or divine. As we have seen, the impact of our attachment to these ‘norms’
leads to a much larger rejection which finally includes ourselves and perhaps all others.
The presence and effects of these attitudes in many of our relationships are not,
however, always easy to perceive and this takes us back to the concerns of disability
theology. For in the case of persons with intellectual disabilities, the effects are visible in
the rejection of the wholeness, worth, and presence of these people in our societies, our
churches, and our lives. If the correlative rejection identifies something true, then our
treatment of persons with intellectual disabilities may be the signpost of a much larger
social, ethical, and theological problem. As Hauerwas bluntly suggests, how we treat
them is an early warning sign of ‘the culture of death’.57 If he is correct, this article may
indicate some of the habits of self-perception and rituals of knowing which shape such a
culture, one where, to sustain our self-deception we cannot but reject those who remind
us of our dependence and vulnerability – who falsify our norms – and, if Eckhart is to
be believed, where we also cannot but reject God.
Notes
1. See Swinton’s discussion of the various works which articulate this through various re-
imagings of God as disabled. Swinton, “Disability, Ableism, and Disableism,” 446.
2. ICD 10 is a World Health Organisation publication and will be succeeded by ICD 11 in
2018. It is widely used in clinical practice in conjunction with the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which is now in its 5th edition.
3. Harshaw, God Beyond Words, 14–15.
4. Ibid., 15.
5. “No Secrets: Guidance on Developing and Implementing Multi-Agency Policies and
Procedures to Protect Vulnerable Adults from Abuse,” 8–9. Adults are over 18. Anyone
under 18 is already treated as ‘vulnerable’. For examples of the kind of abuse they
experience and of their having difficulty understanding or communicating these experi-
ences see Gravell, Loneliness and Cruelty.
6. The term ‘persons’ with intellectual disabilities is widely used in contemporary literature
to prioritise the personhood of the people we are talking about and thus disrupt a
definition of who they are that focuses primarily on their disabilities. This may create
some confusion in our discussion of Peter Singer’s use of ‘personhood’, which explicitly
excludes persons with intellectual disabilities. It is, I firmly believe, better to be confronted
with syntactical inelegance than to find easy ways of speaking about people with these life
experiences as if they somehow constitute a group distinct from the rest of humanity,
when our ways of thinking about and interacting with them – as this article argues – are
already so harmfully attuned to treating them as such.
7. Singer, Practical Ethics, 160; 76. Note, I take self-consciousness to require rationality and
thus continue to refer only to rationality and autonomy.
8. For an interesting discussion of how such judgements in fact construct the conditions by
which we then qualitatively judge the capacities and lives of persons with intellectual
disabilities see Rapley, The Social Construction of Intellectual Disability, chap. 3.
9. Rudman, Concepts of Person and Christian Ethics, 42.
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10. For instance, in chapter 6 of Singer and Kuhse, Should the Baby Live?, Singer and Kuhse
offer the same argument about personhood as above. Here, however, they clearly identify
it as a model which allows for the more consistent application of the beliefs of parents,
medical practitioners, and medical policy about the relative worth of certain forms of life
which the authors explore in detail in the earlier chapters of the work (See Singer and
Kuhse, 28).
11. For detailed reflections on the continued presence of these beliefs in North America, see
Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition.”
12. See, for instance, Giubilini and Minerva, “After-Birth Abortion”
13. See Hauerwas, “Suffering the Retarded.”
14. Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 50.
15. Ibid., 51.
16. Ibid., 53–54.
17. Ibid., 56.
18. Ibid., 56–59.
19. Ibid., 60.
20. Ibid., 46–7.
21. Ibid., 63–65. Reynolds also examines a third mechanism, Taboo. However, the rituals of
assimilation and stigmatisation are sufficient for our argument.
22. Leading to hierarchical judgements of their lives, hinted at in the possible use of Singer’s
category of personhood as a scale and also evinced clearly in the hierarchy of disability
which persists even in the disability movement. See Reinders, Receiving the Gift of
Friendship, 27.
23. See note 14 above.
24. Ibid., chap. 3.
25. Ibid., 11.
26. Reynolds, “Love Without Boundaries.”
27. Nouwen, Adam, God’s Beloved, 26.
28. Ibid., 31.
29. Ibid., 34–5.
30. Vanier, Becoming Human, 25.
31. Nouwen, Adam, God’s Beloved, 36–7.
32. Ibid., 67.
33. Ibid., 47, 64–9.
34. See Spink, The Miracle, The Message, The Story, Jean Vanier and l’Arche, chap. 1.
35. Staley, “Intellectual Disability and Mystical Unknowing,”398–9).
36. de Vinck, The Power of Powerlessness.
37. See Young, Encounter with Mystery.
38. Nouwen, Adam, God’s Beloved, 67.
39. Kieckhefer, “Meister Eckhart’s Conception of the Soul’s Union with God.”
40. Sermon 5b, Colledge and McGinn, Meister Eckhart, 183. References to ‘sermon(s)’
followed by a number indicates the numberings of German sermons in the critical
editions of Eckhart’s works in, Quint and Steer, Meister Eckhart, Deutsche Werke.
41. Sermon 1, Davies, Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings, 153.
42. Davies.
43. Sermon 28, (Walshe, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart., 132), and
Commentary on Exodus, n.14–21 (McGinn, Meister Eckhart, Teacher and Preacher,
45–48).
44. Sermon 39, Walshe, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, 297.
45. For passing beyond ‘means’ in our knowledge of God, see sermon 45.
46. For an interesting treatment of God’s self-image see sermon 70, Walshe, The Complete
Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, 231.
47. Sermon 103, Walshe, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, 56.
48. McGinn, The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart, chap. 3.
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49. Sermon 101, my trans., Quint and Steer, Meister Eckhart, Deutsche Werke, vol. IV., 339,
30–2.
50. Sermon 16b, Walshe, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, 114–8.
51. For the theme of our ground and God’s ground being the same ground see sermon 39,
Walshe, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, 223.
52. Turner, The Darkness of God, 139.
53. Sermon 103, Walshe, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, 56.
54. See sermon 102, Walshe, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, 44., n.7.
55. Again a claim justified by the ground’s synonymy with the Imago Dei.
56. Sermon 104, Walshe, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, 49.
57. Hauerwas, Vanier, and Swinton, Living Gently in a Violent World, 56.
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